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The Efficient Market Hypothe sis is a core theory which explain s how the securities market s work . It
proposes that capital markets are efficient to varying degrees where in this context, the term efficient
means that the price of a share reflects information that pertains to the company (Fama, 1969). There are
two types of investors, those who can consistently make above average returns and the other, those who
lose their money due to unfavorable movements in the market. According to (Fama, 1969) market players
can 't earn an above average return on their investment from information trading as long as markets are
efficient, where information trading is making investment decisions based on information acquired on
various securities. This gives rise to phenomena which can't be explained by EMH. Examples are 'day of
the week' effect and 'month of the year" effect which shows that on certain days, returns are lower than
on others. (Gao, 2005) shows that an investor making decisions based on such phenomena could very
well earn abnormal returns
Expectations on election outcomes tend to influence the level of business activity in a country (Faal ,
2007). (Otieno, 2016) shows that during election years, the GDP of Kenya contracts due to factors
including expectations of investors on the election outcome and uncertainty about future changes in the
legal aspect of conducting business. This is contrary to evidence from some developed as well as other
emerging economies where (Block, 2002) states that an economy expands as a result of fiscal stimulus
prior to election years as an incumbent administration chases something tangible to show for in bid to get
votes .
Pol itics and financial markets have an important link as the markets act as a source of funds for
government expenditure. Governments use Repos and Reverse Repos as monetary policy instruments as
well as sovereign bonds for various proj ects. The market s also, through share prices , act as mirrors of
public expectations on the outcome of the elections following the tenets of EMH . Som e markets, such as
the Iow a Electronic Market are used to predict electi on outcomes with great accuracy via the share prices,
indic es and the volumes traded during these election periods (Berg , 2008).
1.] Motivation of Study
Numerous studies have investigated links between General Elections. volat ility of share return s over this
period. political business cycles and market efficiency both in developed and emerging market s.
(BialK owski , 2008) discusses the effects of electi ons on volatility of share return s and effects of elections
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on the stock market, (Menge, 2013) examines the performance of stocks pre and post-election where he
finds that stock returns are significantly high er before than after an election. (Lusinde, 2012) Investigates
effects of the same on volat ility of returns using 20 blue chip companies where he finds that volatility
stock retu rns increases during genera l elec tions. While th is work is com men dable as recent and pione er
work in Kenya, it is neither conclusive nor adequate ly representat ive where (Lusinde , 2012) looks at the
twenty top performers at the NSE which are hardly representative of the economy and (Menge, 2013) is
inconclusive as he looks at only market return as the only factor that affects company performance.
This project investigates the impact of elections on the share prices or the face value of the firms listed in
the NASI and the implications it has on EMH. The use of the NASI index would give a robust illustration
of general election effects on stocks at the NSE as it is a benchmark index comprising of all stocks of
companies listed on the NSE. Looking at the implications this would have on EMH adds to existing
literature on this field . To the best of my knowledge, there is limited work in Kenya showing the
relationship between EMH and Election Periods and volatility of share returns over Election Periods.
1.2 Problem Statement
Past studies done on volatility, election period and EMH in Kenya, have a gap between the volatility of
share returns around the election period and EMH. Studi es which have been carried out thus far in Kenya
have focused on the effects of elections on the stock mark et and volatility of returns of NS E 20 listed
companies around general elections in Kenya leaving out the aspect of overall market efficiency.
(Kithinji , 2005) studies the impact of general electi ons in Kenya on stock market performance which
involves undertaking a monthly trend analysis of the NSE 20. He concludes that it is difficult to safely
COnfil111 that the general electi on is an event that causes the difference in market perform ance.
(Murigi, 2008) carri es out research investigat ing the effect of General Elections on retu rns of securities at
the NSE. He examines excess returns for every mark et segment in the NSE 60 days pre and post-el ecti on
dur ing the 1992,1997 and 2002 elect ions .The market model is used in this study with the conclusion
being that that the Financial and Investments segment experiences higher change in security prices during
election years .
1.3 Research Objectives
The objectiyes of the study are as follows
1. To invest igate if share pric es at the NSE experience excess volatility around election period
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2. To establish if the excess volatility implies an Elect ion Business Cycle and its implications on
Market efficiency.
1.4 Research Hypothesis
The research hypotheses are two and they are
H01: Share prices do not experience excess volatility around election period
HAl: Share prices experience excess volatility around election period
Hoz:The excess volatility does not imply an Election Business Cycle and has no implications on Market
efficiency
HA2 : The excess volatility implies an Election Business Cycle and has implications on Market efficiency
1.5 Scope of the Study
This paper limits its scope to election years where there was a significant change in government regime
such as the 2002 General election or the changing from coalition government to multiparty elections such
as the 2013 general elections. The study compares share return volatilities and actual share returns from
2011 to 2015
1.6 Significance of the study
One intended outcome of this paper IS to show that uncertainty related to election outcomes has
implications for the risk-averse investor. According to (Baxter , 1997) , majority of investors hold domestic
assets which may expose them to diversifiabIc risk i.e. country specific political risk . A portfolio of
mainly domestic risk is subject to this country speci fic risk on the ons et of elections. This is illustrated by
the volatility of returns experienced around eject ion period wh ich would otherwise be avoided by holding
a portfolio with mixed asset classes of di fferent geographica l reg ions.
This paper also proposes that investment in equities around election peri od wou ld be a bad decision for
risk-av erse investors. Over this peri od. returns are more volatile and the likelihood for an adve rse
outco me OCCUlTing is signi ficant ly highe r. Th is is a result of market wide fl uctuations in response to





Effects of elections on the per form ance of shares on el ifferent excha nges across the globe have been an
area of interest in Finance and Economic academia for qu ite some time. In Economics, more spec ifically
Macroeconomics, this would allude to presence of Political Business Cycles which would make valid
cases for Monetary Authority Independence (Mishkin, 2000) and (Alesina, 1993) . For Finance, on the
other hand, this would disprove an established theory such as EMH (Fama, 1969). Of course this would
be hinged on the particular market under study as different mark ets hav e different characteristics. For
example a market might have majority of participants believing in the Information View of Investm ent
(Durnev, 2010). Market phenomena of simil ar stature that have received like interest are , the January
effect and the Day of the Week effect of share prices where share returns are consid erably low on certain
days of the weeks or certain months (Gao , 2005) . According to (Lean, 2007), there are different reasons
for the day of week effects, such as companies releasing bad news on Fridays . The above studi es may
have implications for market efficiency due to the predictability of these cycl es but these are relatively
short periods on which to base cycles on. Election periods are longer periods for which propositions of
cycle s would undermin e the validity of Market Efficiency if it was proven that there is increased volatility
of share prices over election period s and thus a predictable patt ern that could be exploited.
According to the efficient mark et hypothesis (Farna, 1969), in an efficient market , share pric es reflect all
currently available information. More in the context of presidenti al elections, information about futur e
economic pol icies and sector inclination in a given count ry mostly can be inferred from changes in the
pol itical land scape through a party's manifesto during campaigns and the personal make up of a president
candidates and his intended administration. On one hand this informat ion will be reflected in share prices
if the mark et is efficient and on the other, it wou ld affect expec tatio ns of investors differen tly and these
expectat ions direct ly affect the price of sha res:
ln the Kenyan context resea rch by (Lus inde, 2012) concludes that blue chip stocks at the NSE experience
higher volatility around the election period (3 days to and afte r the election period). His focus is on
individual companies of the NSE20 .He studies the volatility at a three day even t window (that is 3 days
post and ex the election) wh ile this study intends 10 have its event window as a year ex and post.
2.1 Conceptual Framework
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2.1.1 Elements of Conceptual Framework
Intervening Variable Dependent Vari ables
2.1.1.1 Election Campaigns
Also known as political campaign , this is an organized effort which seeks to influence decision making
process within a specific group
2.1.1.2 Election Outcome
These are the results of a presidential general election
2.1.1.3 Market Efficiency
This is a core theory in finance which proposes that when a market is efficient, the share price reflects all
available information pertaining to that share (Fama, 1969).
2.1.1.4 Share Price
This is the highest amount that someone is willing to pay for the stock or the lowest amount that it can be
bought for.
2.2 Theories Supporting the Project
There are theories which form the backbone of this project paperand these are EMH, Partisan
Theories of Macroeconomic Cycles, Prospect Theory and Political or Election Business Cycle. Each
theory deals with individual disciplines which when linked together form the basis of this project
2.2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis
(Malkiel , 1970) states that the role ofa capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy's capital
stock . They state that the ideal world is a capital market is one which firms can make production
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investm ent decisions and inves tors can choose among securi ties that represent ownership over these
activities assuming that these prices at any time fully reflect all avail able inform ation. From this aspect of
ful ly reflecting all ava ilable inform ation is called efficienc y. A few assumptions are made in earlier works
on EM}-) in-order to support the statement share prices fully reflect all ava ilable information. Th ese are i)
successive price changes are independ ent and ii) successive pric e changes are identically distributed.
These two assumptions are imply the random nature or the random walk model of share prices
In-order for the capital market efficiency to hold, there is a set of sufficient conditions that has to be met.
One should consider a market where there are no transaction costs in trading securities, all available
information is costlessly available to all market participants and all market participants accept the
implications of the freely available information on the prices (current and future) of shares. However
looking at the sufficient conditions, some of them would only exist in an ideal world and current
securities markets exist and operate in a very different manner .For one there are transaction costs that
arise when trading securities, these can be brokerage fees , costs of gathering information and secondly
information is costly and not all individuals have access to information or rather different market
participants have different sets of information. Regardless of this problem of information asymmetry
(Akerlof, 1970) and there being transaction costs, these capital market conditions are sufficient but not
necessary. According to (Malkiel , 1970) tran sacti on costs, information that is not freely available to
investors and disagreement among investors about the implications of given information are potential
sources of market inefficiencies .
According to (M alkiel , 1970) there are type s of information subsets that share pric es adjust to , giv ing rise
to three forms of effici ency which are weak form effici ency, semi-strong form efficiency and strong 1'01111
efficiency . Wh en a market is effic ient in the weak form, share prices reflect all historical data on the share
pric es. One impli cation of weak 1'01111 effi ciency is that an inves tor cannot make an abnormal return by
tradin g from studying historical share data (technical analysis).When a market is efficient in its semi
strong form, share prices reflect all publicly ava ilable inform ation, the implication being an indi vidual
cannot mak e above abnormal returns by acting upon all publ icly ava ilable inform ation (fund amental
analysis). \Vhen a market is efficient in its strong form , the shares reflect all available inform ation,
publicl y available and the non-public ly ava ilable. This implies that an investor acting upon inform ation
that is not publicly available cannot make an abnorma l return. (Chordia, 2008) find s that liqui dity
encourages arbitrage acti vity which in tum enhances market efficiency. The impl ication is that in more
liquid regim es, a mark et is more efficie nt as a result of investors trying to take advantage of arbitrage
oppo rtunities. Arbitrage is an instanc e when an investor C3n make a riskless return on an investm ent.
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This world of effici ent capital markets is an idealist ic one, however it has been observed that most
developed markets are efficie nt in the semi strong 1'01111 and most emerging market s are efficient in the
weak form (Mobarek, 2008). fo r example in our case, (M lambo , 200 7) and (Appi ah-Ku si, 2003) hold that
the Na irobi Securities Exchange. among others, are efficient in the weak 1'01111.
2.2.2 Partisan Theory of Macroeconomic Cycles
Theory of macroeconomic policy proposes that political parties weight nominal and real economic
performance differently. According to (Hibbs, 1994), left party governments are more inclined than right
wing ones to pursue expansive policies which are ultimately meant to yield lower unemployment and
higher growth but also assuming the risk of higher inflation. (Norberto, 1997) holds that a left wing party
is one that supports social equality through the welfare state through industrial democracy while a right
wing party is a conservative party that is rooted in social hierarchy and un-equality and seeks to conserve
that and one that supports Laissez Faire capitalism. The welfare state is concept of government where the
state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of social and economic well-being of its citizens.
(Vergne, 2009) and (Faal , 2007) hold that the Parti san Theory does apply to emerging markets in Africa
and more specifically Kenya but and this helps explain the emergence of business cycles in the Kenya and
thus see its implications on EMl-!.
According to (Hibbs, 1994) the main aim of the governing party is implementing policies that favor their
core voters . This means that when there is a shift of govenun ent, economic policy and outcome
fluctu ations are politic al signals with higher output and infla tion plus a lower unemployment rate being a
hallmark of left wing parti es .
One of the main propositions of Parti san theory is that each part y has its own Modus Operandi regarding
to its Economic Policy. Th erefore a part y that has more sound economic policies or has those which have
a proven track record should have most of the indicators in its favor. (Menge, 2013) holds that apart from
inflation , gross domestic growth and unempl oyment , a countries stock exchange should also refle ct this
by havin g a higher return on average. (No rdhaus , 1975) stipulates that polit icians are able to repeatedly
fool voters eve n though voters have form ed a view of outcome of upcoming elections. These early
political bu siness cycle models are based on the assumption that voters are myopic which is ex plained by
faster rate s of real growth and higher inflati on in pre-election periods. More recent work deviates from
this assumption and instead base the models on the Lucas Cr itique (Luc as, 1976) whi ch proposes that
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economic actors fOIl11 rational expectations by optimally using all available information to forecast the
future
2.2.3 Prospect Theory
People respond to risk and uncertainty 111 different ways based on their character. The securities
exchanges, like other markets, are comprised of buyers and sellers who are essentially people with
different behavioral traits . These behavioral and character traits ultimately influence how market
participants make decisions under uncertainty and risk. (Kahneman, 1979) propose that people assign less
value to outcomes which are only probable to outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This is called the
certainty effect which causes individuals to be risk averse when making choices that involve sure gains
and to be risk seeking when making choices that involve sure losses. When we sayan individual is risk
averse, they prefer an outcome or a prospect that is certain to any risky prospect that has an expected but
not certain outcome.
When making decisions, individuals usually eliminate or factor out aspects of the outcomes which are
similar to each other. Thi s tend enc y is call ed the isolation effect and it causes an individual to have
inconsistent preferences when making a decision on the same prospect but presented in different forms.
They conclude that inve stors however are not consistently risk averse and that their behavior changes
with the outcomes facing them . (Kahneman, 1979) conclude by saying that investors are risk averse when
they are facing gains and are risk seeking when they are facing losses. These findings are inconsi stent
with the findin gs of Expected Utility Theory which proposes that individuals weigh deci sions based on
how much their total wealth will be after the outcome. Th is is not the case however as individuals look at
prospects as gains or losses and not as total wealth after the outcome.
2.3 Links between the Different theories
2.3.1 Link between Political Risk (Election) and Share Price Volatility
Political Risk refer s to the risk that investment return s could suffer as a result of change in political
regime or instability in a count ry. This is associated with the uncertainty of the business landscape in
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which a firm ope rates in, which is in tum is hin ged on the govemment in administrat ion , which is a mult i-
party sta te is determined by the outcome of an election . In a peri od preceding national elections there is
usually a lot of uncert aint y pert aining to bu sin ess and eco nomic prospect s of a country. T his is
parti cul arl y ev ident in Ken ya and othe r emerg ing economies (although not limited to) in the world. Pri or
to the 2007 elec tion, research sho ws that most prudent bu siness ' postp on ed purchase of inventory and
new supplies and instead opted to sell of their current inventory. In response to this uncertainty rational
managers and investors postpone investments until this uncertainty is resolved after the elections (Julio,
2012)
(Durnev, 20 10) posits that during election years, company share prices are less volatile. This is a result of
investors being of the belief that shares do not reflect sufficient firm specific information to be decision
making criteria. This is caused by election outcome uncertainty and the pre-election period policy
changes. This makes stock prices noisier signals for an investor to follow when making investment
decisions. Following these rat ionale investors would not base their decisions on the share prices but rather
on other factors such as fundamentals . An investor would thus rely less on share prices if he had more
information on a company relative to other investors. Information that would affect decision making
would be information such as tend er awards or likely economic government stances like Jubilee
gov ernment ' s stance on digital integration .
T his however can be disproved owing to the fact that not all inv estors are rationa l and are aware of the
inform ational view of investment ca usi ng the share prices to be volatile du e to inves tor beli efs and
expecta tions as foll ows from effic ient market hypothes is and not every body is privy to this
informationtinsider dealing) wh ich is a co nvictable offence.
(B ialKow ski , 2008) seeks to link election sho cks with the level volati lity of shares in different countries
in the OE eD. El ect ion shocks are the invesiors surprise at the final outcome of the elections. Here
indexes as representative of eac h country ' s stoc k market and counter speci fic political risk . These shocks
are strong ly refl ected in share prices in accordance to (Farna, 196 9) and increased levels of vo latility are
observed. Th e pape r highli ght s tha t market participant s tended to ac t in a vo lati le mann er w he n elections
were closely cont ested , change in pol itical orienta tion in the government and if the country had
co mpulso ry voti ng laws. The first two factor s co ntributed to the unc ert aint y and hen ce vo lat ility whil e
voting law s improved ce rtainty as reduced the cha nce of ma rgi nal voting groups ca us ing surp rises in the
voting outco me
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In suppo rt of the arguments forwa rded above, (Ki m, 200 I)assel1s that political events such as presidentia l
elections have a significant impac t on the market vola tility and retu ms. The paper makes use a
components j ump filter to iden tify market retum and volatility jumps and then subsequently selects those
associated with pol itical developments.
2.3.2 Link between Political Business Cycles and Share Prices/Returns and Market
Efficiency
A phenomenon that poses a valid challenge to the Efficient M arket Hypothesis IS that of Politi cal
Bu siness Cycles (Nordhaus, 1975) or Election Bu siness Cycles (Jul io, 201 2)
These Poli tical cycles of investment or election business cycle s are caused when the incumbent
government attempts to synchronize their spending patt em with their terms in office . This means pursuing
expansionary pol icies when election years are near and when they are re-elect ed they adopt contract ionary
measures to curb inflation (which was caused by the same expansionary policies) (BialKowski, 2008).
(Julio, 2012 ) alludes to the exis tence of poli tica l cycl es of investm ent and show that electora l uncertainty
decreases corporate investments at the finn level. Their main argume nt is that poli tical uncertaint y crea tes
uncertaint y whether the investm ent will payoff in the future.
(W ong, 2009) map the presidenti al election cyc le in United States stoc k markets. Their study revea ls that
approximately four decades from January 1965 through to December 2003, US stock prices close ly
followed the four-yea r Presi dential Election Cycle where in genera l, stock pr ices fell during the first half
of a Presidency, reached a trough in the second year, rose during the second hal f of a Presidency, and
reached a peak in the third or fourth yea r. This trend is found to have been adopted by greater part of the
last ten Uni ted States administrations,
(No rdhaus , 1975) also postu late s tha t, irrespective of thei r political orientation, incumbent s parties
primary goal is vote maxim ization and thu s policie s are pursued to solely to win election s. Followi ng this ,
the incumbent s will try to self-servingly attune their spending to the timing of elections. The result is a
Political Bus iness Cycle that has troughs and pea ks. However the incumbent government can on ly pursue
such tactics success fully if the pub lic do not have rational expec tatio ns (Rogoff, 1990).
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(Booth, 2003)states that the U.S. stock market tends to perform better in the final two years of the
presidential term . This affirms (Allvine, 1980) on existence of electoral business cycl e but can also be
explained behaviorally. One reason for improved performance is that investors have high expectations
that the new administration will deliver on its pre-election promises. However wh en these expectations
are not met the optimism wea rs off and this reflected accordingly in the stock mark et.
(All vine, 1980) find that stock performance is stronger in the 2 years preceding an election compared to 2
years after. In the paper different investment strategies are pursued to see the behavior of stock prices pre
and post-election year. Their results do have interesting implications for the random walk assumptions of
shares being unpredictable and un-exploitable in (Fama, 1969) . Based on the time series properties of
stocks ( i.e . Stocks having a generally upward trend and the trend having significant movements) one
implication is that an investor can earn a positive return in the stock market if he manages to invest in a
representative set of stock and holds them for a long enough period for the positive and negative
movements to cancel each other out , leaving the trend growth as price appreciation. The second
implication is that if an investor can predict these movements with accuracy then he/she would make even
greater returns.
(Morgenstern, 1963) discovered a statistical dep endence(thus challenging efficient market hypothesis on
the randomness of share prices) in change of stock prices over long cycles but underpl ayed the
importance in the following manner: "Th e evidence of 'cycles' obtained in our studies is so weak that
cyclical investment is at best only marginally worthwhile. Even this small margin will rapidly disappear
as it is being made use of. "
To test the above (Allvine , 1980) compare the use of a buy and hold strategy and a trading strategy. The
trading strategy is set up to buy /switch from stocks to money market instruments in accordance to the
presidential cycle in stock prices. Here the presidential cycle in this context is the four year pol itical
bus iness cycle where poli ticians have a strong incentive to stimulate economy prior to an election year
then pursue contractionary poli cies after the election year. While this may hold true for the US economy,
this may not be the case for Kenya . In Kenya busine ss is considered to slow down in an election year due
to uncertaint y concerning the political stability or the country. Th e findings indicat e that share prices are
more sensitive dur ing election years and also a trading strategy is super ior to a buy and hold strategy thus
discrediting Efficient Market Hypoth esis.
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2.3.4 Link between public sentiment during election year and share prices
When a mark et is efficient, share prices re flec t all publ icly avai lab le inform ation (Fa ma, 1969), including
public sentiment pertaini ng to an electio n. This public sentiment could cause changes in the vo latility of
share prices depending on pub Iic mood and genera l atmosphere duri ng the pre and pos t-election period .
There are many ways of measuring public sent iment in a bid to predict elections and one of those ways is
use of opi nion surveys or polls. During election campaigns and key legisl ative proce sses, polls are
important tools which act as a for ecast to as how events will shape up . Earlier methods of poll ing were
often inadequate as predictive tools if not plain expensive to conduct. Some of these methods included
stopping peopl e in the streets or visiting people in their households (MacInlay, 1997). When covering a
large populatio n this proved to give unrepresentative samples and wa s costly. This method was
abandoned in favor of telephone based surveys where po llst ers use randomizing systems to come up with
lists of numbers to dial. However a more efficient method of measuring publ ic sentiment pertaining to
elect ions especially in Kenya would be coming up with samples from vot er registrat ion lists (Green,
2003) . This, alb eit a long way from achieving this , would greatly improve the accuracy of pre- election
polls and fu rnish public and politicians alike with valuable information.
(Boll en, 20 I I) use a novel app roach in measuring thi s public sentiment by usin g of data from tw itter
feeds to gauge effect of publi c sentiment on the Dow Jon es Industrial Ind ex over the period of 2008
elections . One might imagine that this is a new way of gathering public sentiment but this is hardly far
from it. Social media plat form s and the interne t have prov ided marketers, analysts and poll sters with a
ric h toolb ox to conduct with research. An example would be how Goog le sea rch queries have been used
to provide early indicators of consum er spe nding patterns and disease outbreaks or in the case of
consumer p rofiling, where firm s offer other corpora tions profil es of indi viduals, whic h are made up from
an ind ividua l's day to day navigat ion of the internet (Bughin, 201 3) . In (Bo llen, 20 I I ), they state that the
ca lm ness (or exci tement levels) of the pub lic on twitter is thus predict ive of the DJI A rath er than general
levels of positive sentiment.
In genera l, rati onal investors will strive to assess vo ter sentiment us ing all avai lab le sources of
information , such as poll s, macroeconomi c data, elec tora l debates, or media repo rts . According to
(BialKowsk i, 2008) , in an effic ient market, investor ex pec tations will be aggrega ted into a conse nsus
foreca st. and stock pr ices will mo ve to re flect it
The link between mood and pu blic sentiment dur ing election year and share prices is also wel l illustrated
in (Nofsinge r, 200 4) , who is of th e schoo l of thoug ht that stock market is a barom eter of pub lic sentiment




3.1 Data types and data sources
The data set to be used are the daily returns from which the daily volatilities of the NSE20 will
be extracted. In the study the frequency of data employed is daily returns and volatilities to allow
heteroskedasticity during the shocks (election period) to be more evident as proposed by (Rigobon,
2003). Data on the index will be obtained from the Nairobi Securities Exchange.
The data will span from 2011 to 2015 in order to capture the effects of the 2013 general election and
to see the returns over the 4 year cycle. This period of time was chosen because there was a
significant change in government regime, from coalition government to multiparty elections.
3.2 The Model
We gauge the impact of the shocks (presidential elections) on the second moment of return
distribution using a volatility event study approach as outlined in (Maclnlay, 1997)
The procedure is as follows:
1. Identification of the event of interest. Here the events of interest are the presidential
elections in Kenya for the years 2002 , 2007 and 2013.
11. Definition of the event window. The event window shall be one year to election day and









years years I years
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I years
111. Selection of the sample set of firms ( NSE20 ) to be included in the analysis
IV . Prediction of a "normal" return during the event window in the absence of the event.
Here we shall need to predict what the return would have been had there been no
elections using both NSE20 and NASI returns.
v. Estimation of the "abnormal" return within the event window, where the abnormal return
is defined as the difference between the actual and predicted returns, without the event
occurring. This explained further below
VI. Compare visually the plot of the actual variance and the benchmark variance through the
election cycle.
VII. Testing whether the abnonnal return is statistically different from zero
The study will involve computing the changes recorded in share returns which will be gotten
from past NSE20 pnces.. To amve at conclusive
results, the study will compare the performance of the NSE20 before, during and after general
2013 elections
This will be done by first conducting an analysis by isolating the NSE20 component of variance
within a GARCH (1,1) framework:
Ru = ex + fJR; + EU I EU ~ N(O,hu )




Ri,t and R~ are the continuously compounded (log) returns on the NSE20 and a proxy of the
market (represented by Nairobi All Share Index) on day t, respectively.
£u denotes the NSE20 returns, and hustands for its conditional volatility.
Equati on (1 .1) and (1.2) are estimated jointly using the Maximum Likelihood (ML-
ARCH/Marquardt) method over a period immediatel y preceding the event window, the event
wind ow being the time the event occurs.
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(Brown , 1985) prescribe the use of 250 daily returns to estima te the benchm ark model. Howe ver
this might prove inadequa te to model GARCH processes accura tely and a larger number of daily
return s are requ ired. We choose a time period of 1242 trading days divided accordingly into 3
periods, one year as the es timation window , two yea rs as the eve nt window and one year as the
post estimation period . We then proceed to measure abnormal volatility whi ch to do this , we
need to consider variation in Ei,t around the event date in relation to its regular level when the
event is not occurring. We use the GARCH model to predict what the volatility would have been
had the election not happened.
However as noted in (BialKowski, 2008), equation (1.2) is a one step ahead forecast and won't
generate an event-independent projection. To remedy this , we make the volatility forecast
conditional on the information set available prior to the occurrence of the event .The benchmark
for volatility for the n-th day we will use shall be defined as follows .
E[h In ] ~ ",n-l( ~ ~)j (~ ~ )n-l ~ h ( ~ ~ )n-l ~ Zi.t"+n Ht " = Yo L..j=O Yl + Yz + Yl + Yz Yl i,t " + Yl + Yz Yl Ei•t"
The distribution of the residuals during the event window can be described as
Wh ere:
Me, is the multiplicative effect of the event on volatility,
ARc Is the event induced abnormal return and r > t ".
(1.3)
With our null hypothesis that the investors are not surprised by the outcome of the election, M,
should be equal to 1 as there is no multiplicative effe ct of the election on the volatility of retums.
When we demean the residu als with the cross section average (i.e. subtract the cross sectional
average from each observation), this would make them norm ally distributed with a mean of zero.
Their variance, und er the ass umption of residu al orthogo nality, would be given by:
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£1DRVi t Stands for the event-independent demeaned residual variance and
I I N is the number of events included in the sample.
The parameter of interest is Mt which measures the effect of election shock on volatility in the
exchange. (Hillard, 2002) gives us a means in which to estimate this parameter(How? And why..
on combining residual standardization with a cross-sectional approach in the spirit of Boehmer et
aI. (1991.To answer why=to come up with M, for the actual observed data», where we calculate
the estimate as cross-sectional variance of demeaned residuals, standardized by the event-
independent demeaned residual standard deviation [£IDRVi,t,P/z
(1.5)
Where Ej,t = Ru-(a+ fJR;) andt >t '
Under the null hypothesis, the demeaned standardized residuals follow a standard normal
distribution because MI equals one. Consequently, the abnormal percentage change in volatility
on any day t of the event window is(M t - 1). For a given event window (n 1 , nz) the cumulative
abnormal volatility can be calculated as
The null hypothesis can thus be expressed as
Ho : CAV(11 1 , 11 z) = 0




Since under the null , Mt is a variance of IV independent N(O, I) rand om variables Mt(N - 1)-X~-1
and L~~1i l Mt (N - 1) - X[,V-1) (ll z- n
1+





RESULTS, DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
This chapter presents findin gs on the Arch Model empl oyed and the significance of the test
statistic from the collected and analyzed data. The data analysis is presented in form of a line
graphs and tables. It depicts the volatility of abnorma l retums (subtractin g the predicted retum s
from the actual retums) .
Depending on the results, we are able to make inferences on the election business cycle and its
implications on market efficiency at the NSE.
4.1 Data Analysis
This part describes the steps undertaken to analyze the data. NSE20 and NASI Index return data
for a period of 2yrs before the election and 2 years after the election is collected with the event
date being 4th March 2013
The data is tested for presence of ARCH effects (Appendix i) and subsequently a GARCH model
is employed in estimating the mean and the variance equations.(Appendix ii).From the variance
equat ion we then extract the conditional volatility whi ch we then use to estimate the benchmark
volatility. This is the volatility that would be experienced in absence of the event.
Using the benchmark volatility, we find the multiplicative effect of the event, which is then used
to come up with a test of significance which has a chi square distribution . Equation (1.9) in the
previou s chapter.
4.2 Results and Discussion





Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
0.000151 0.000117 1.987044 0.2002
0.046677 0.00585 3 7.974266 0.0000
Variance Equation
6.30E-06 5.64E-07 11.16318 0.0000
0.298494 0.022305 13.38236 0.0000
0.608750 0.019546 31.14486 0.0000
Table 1: shows the results of the coefficien ts of the es tim ate d mean and subsequent variance equation.
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The constant and the coe fficient of Nairobi All Share Index in the mean equation are statisticall y
di fferent from zero at 95 % confidence interval while in the Variance equ ation , all coefficients
are also statisti call y different from zero. Thi s allows us to examine the effec t of the ind ependent
variable on the dependent variables well.
Below is the chi squa re test for the test statistic
293.103921 This value exceeds the chi sq critical value
4.2.2 Election Business Cycle
In the overall period from 4th March 20 12 to 4th March 20 l4(event window), the Nairobi
Securities exchange has experienced excess volatility compared to the estimation window, 4th
March 2011 to 3rd March 2012, and the post estimation window period.S'" March 2014 to 4th
March 2015
During an election business cycle, the rationale of the incumbent is to secure more votes by
building or implementing visible proj ects when the elections are nearing. This will serve as an
example that is fresh in the minds of the voters of their "committed" stance towards
development. This implies that towards the Election Day, there will be more fiscal spending in
private and public sectors. This is the cause of the excess volatility during the event window









100 200 300 400 500 600 700 BOO 900
x - observations/days
Y - Volatility
Estimation window- observation 0-250
Event Window- observation 251-738
Post Estimation Window 739 - 1000
From the graph of volatility, it can be noted that the period with the most number of spikes and
also with the highest magnitude is the event window
4.2.2 Market Efficiency
Market efficiency at the NSE would have been proved if there were no deviations from the
mean. This would be true if the null hypothesis fails to be rejected would simply imply that the
Actual Return is equal to the Expected Return
This is inferred from the derivation of the Multiplicative effect because under the null hypothesis
Mt (multiplicative effect) is equal to l .This means that the outcomes of the election don 't
surprise investors and hence the abnormal percentage change in volatility on any day t of the
event window is(Mt - 1) which in this case will be 0
This is illustrated clearly by use of a graph plotting variances of forecasted NSE log returns and





















1- NSE20 LOG RET - ' NSE20 LOG F I
x- Days where n=2208
y- Volatility
From the above graph, we can infer from observation that the variance of the Actual NSE log
returns is higher than the Forecasted NSE log returns.
j
J
Apart from visual observation, the value for the test statistic I~~nl Mt(N - 1) is greater than the chi

















CONCLUSION, RECCOMENDATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The empirical evidence shows the existence of election business cycle and the lack of efficiency
at the Nairobi securities Exchange. The volatility in the event window was tremendous in terms
of frequency and magnitude when compared to both the estimation window and post estimation
window periods. Also, when comparing actual volatility versus forecasted volatility (where there
is no effect of election), the actual volatility is higher than the forecasted/conditional volatility.
An implication could be informed investors and market speculators could be making money
from a strategy that involves selling stocks and buying bonds around the event window and
switching back to stocks after selling bonds in the post estimation period. (Allvine, 1980)
Presence of Election Business Cycle in Kenya may lead to inflationary pressure in pre-election
periods and deflation in the periods after elections. (Pfeifer, 2014) states that election business
cycles cause policy risk . This is the uncertainty abou t monetary policy, taxes and fiscal spending.
Although the effect of uncertainty is not large, it can affect the transmission of monetary policy.
This is valuable information for the Central bank of Kenya or any monetary policy authority to
have when formulating their policy.
5.1 Problems encountered in the course of the study
Still on this field , a good area of future research would be investigating effects of elections on
share volatilities and the implications it has on market efficiency with more than one election
cycle . The problem facing this research is the absence of enough data points as the proxy for the
market (Nairobi all Share Index) was only founded recently (2008).An alternative to waiting well












I. Graph of Actual, Fitted and Residuals of continuously compounded NSE20 returns
The first step of the data analysis is to find out if the returns are affected by Arch effects. This is
characterized by volatility clustering whereby periods of high volatility leads to continued
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II. M ean Eq ua tion and Va r iance E qu at ion
After findi ng the arch effects in the data sam ple, we proceed to estimate the M ean and Variance equat ions
using a Garch ( 1, I ) model. Below are the results
Dependent Variable: NSE20_LOG_RET
Method : ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution
Date: 11/27/16 Time : 17:24
Sample: 1 2110
Included observations: 2110
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations
Presample variance : backcast (parameter = 0.7)














Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
0.000151 0.000117 1.281044 0.2002
0.046677 0.005853 7.974266 0.0000
Variance Equation
6.30E-06 5.64E-07 11.16318 0.0000
0.298494 0.022305 13.38236 0.0000
0.608750 0.019546 31.14486 0.0000
0.153022 Mean dependent var -0.000169
0.168552 S.D. dependentvar 0.008401
0.008365 Akaike info criterion -7.154700
0.147520 Schwarz criterion -7.141301




Conditional Va r-ia nce
The variance based on information up to the last day of the estimation window and is used to compute the
benchmark vo latility.
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